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Principle and Compromise

A CONSPICUOUS note in contemporary writing, preaching and teaching is the collapse of moral standards. This is often spoken of as a symptom of cultural breakdown. Descriptively, there is wide agreement among observers regardless of religious and philosophical backgrounds. But in terms of diagnosis there are sharp differences. Even among those who share the Christian faith, which postulates an ultimate "natural," moral law, there is no common understanding of the way in which moral sanctions are apprehended and invoked.

The crucial question seems to concern the relation between the universal and the particular. A Christian philosophy can never be content with the view that only the particular, the concrete, is "real"; for example, that while *men* are real, *man* is a mere semantic abstraction. Even so, it makes a world of practical difference whether or not one assumes that a universal principle can be fully comprehended in a particular instance. The latter assumption underlies all ethical absolutisms. The pacifist, for instance, feels that in every instance of armed warfare the universal law, "Thou shalt not kill," is encountered in its entirety and imposes an unambiguous obligation. The moral appeal of such a position lies precisely in its freedom from ambiguity and in the unequivocal response that it calls forth.

Moreover, rejection of this absolutist position not only entails much mental and spiritual agony as a person seeks to find a way that has not been fully charted, but it is likely to give him an uncomfortable sense of kinship with the "relativist" who insists that there are no ultimate norms. His problem is to reconcile his conviction that true and false, right and wrong, have a meaning that transcends the flux of things with his experience of frustration in the effort to "know for sure" that a particular choice is right in any ultimate sense. It is the function of authority, in all authoritarian systems to lift this burden from the individual and place it on broader shoulders.

The mere fact of being a Protestant and thereby affirming the right of private judgment creates a

grievous problem for the person who is unable to find absolute prescriptions for human behaviour in the Ten Commandments or the Golden Rule. Although we are accustomed to regard as an artful dodger the lawyer who countered Jesus' precept, "Love thy neighbor" with the query, "Who is my neighbor?" that question contains the essence of a perennial quest for the particular duty to which the eye is blinded by the dazzling light of the universal ideal.

Currently the problem is confronted in the issue over "appeasement," that is, compromise with evil in the political sphere. When does yielding to a demand backed by sheer might cease to be appeasement and become a sound strategy? To what extent does dealing with a foe in any human situation inevitably involve a readiness to reconsider, reevaluate, and restate one's peace terms? Is the very concept of unconditional surrender consistent with a moral realism that acknowledges one's own limitations in wisdom and virtue? On the plane of militancy humility passes for cowardice and fear casts out love.

Domestic politics presents the same anomalies. For example, a well-known newspaper "column" recently carried this comment on the President's State of the Union message: "The customary defiant demand for the Fair Employment Practices Act and other items in the civil rights program was conspicuously not included. After five years, the President left out the almost ritual passage, which has regularly plunged each new session of Congress into an instantaneous, embittered and time-consuming dog fight." And this is the explanation: "The argument for doing the expedient thing was really unanswerable. There was not only no hope at all of passing a solid civil rights program at this session; it was also clear that an attempt to insist on the civil rights program would certainly delay and quite probably actually imperil the far more urgent foreign and defense program."

Whether the issue arises in personal relations or in politics it may be devastatingly sharp in times like

these. But to infer that the trouble is wholly due to moral decline is unwarranted. Perplexity is not equivalent to delinquency. A Catholic prelate was quoted in the press recently as attributing the current moral confusion to a lack of regard for right and wrong and declaring that even the national government was "devoid of principle." It will take a lot of proving to establish that moral concern is lacking in America. The want of a compass does not denote disbelief in a magnetic pole. The churchman might, however, have drawn profitably from the storehouse of scholastic philosophy by noting the difference between *synderesis*, the inner constraint to find and do the right, and *syneidesis*, or conscience, the denotative faculty that locates the right in a particular situation. It seems clear that the second area is where the peculiar moral deficit of our times is to be found.

For a Protestant there is no easy way out, but two considerations might help materially. First, we are entitled to the assurance that the moral relativities and ambiguities which render our most serious decisions less than certain do not deprive us of a sense of rectitude when we have done our best to discover

the right. In the realm of *syneidesis* we will continue to grope our way, but in the exercise of *synderesis* we can be as confident as men could be in a simple pastoral civilization. Even when the best course open must be appraised as the lesser of possible evils, to choose that course is an act of positive rectitude.

The other consideration involves a re-examination of our Protestant emphasis on "private judgment." It is often elevated, both in Protestant and in secular circles, to the level of an absolute right. To reject the final authority of a visible ecclesiastical institution need not carry with it a repudiation of corporate sanctions. The fact of community is central in the Christian tradition, but in Protestant ethics the influence of the church upon individual moral decisions has become relatively remote. In the final analysis a person must be governed in his choices by his own conscience, but it is of the essence of the church that it brings to the guidance of the individual conscience the cumulative experience of the Christian community. The church is not just a gathering of free souls, but a community in which souls may become morally and spiritually free.—F. E. J.

Viewing American Policy From Asia

JOHN C. BENNETT

IT is something of a shock to return to America from Asia and find people thinking of the world struggle almost exclusively in military terms. Here the one question that seems to be important is: how many divisions will we need to meet the threat of world Communism? In Asia, especially in India, of far more significance is the question: what is the alternative to Communism?

I do not deny that both questions are important. There is a danger that world Communism will be tempted to use military force to extend its power from country to country as it tried to do in the case of South Korea. There is even danger that if America is not strong the Soviet Union may be tempted to attack this country directly as the chief center of power in the non-Communist world. But we have become so obsessed with these dangers that we may forget the fact that the chief power of Communism is not military power at all. It is the power that comes from its capacity to convince many people that it has the only program that can solve their country's desperate problems. How many must it convince? Only a well organized minority needs to be fully convinced but there must be a very widespread feeling that since everything else has failed

Communism should be given a chance. Outside military power may come in to clinch the matter but it is secondary to the power based upon the possession of a program that seems to be relevant to the needs of a country. No amount of military power in our hands can of itself prevent the spread of Communism in Asia today.

India, the greatest free country in Asia, does not have a strong Communist movement at the present time. In fact Communism has lost rather than gained influence in that country in the past few years. There is however a very widespread fatalism about Communism in India. People feel that the problems of India are so desperate, especially the problems of poverty, feudal landlordism and political corruption, that only a movement which combines a radical program with a method of gaining the political power to put that program into effect will be adequate and many of them see no such movement on the horizon except Communism.

I always attempted to counteract this fatalism but I had to admit the depth and difficulty of the problems and I had to admit that I did not see an alternative to Communism emerging. I stressed the degree of uncertainty concerning the capacity of Com-

munism to deliver India from poverty and the cost in terms of other values to a nation that becomes subject to this most efficient form of totalitarianism. These warnings often fell on deaf ears because of a very strong conviction in India that Communism in Asia will be less oppressive than Communism in Europe. Much will depend upon the developments in China and what is known about them in India. The Communists have an extraordinary capacity for hiding what they do in one place from the innocent victims of their propaganda in another place. But after we have taken account of all that is false in Communist propaganda and of all that is deceptive in the Communist program, Communism would not make great headway if there were real hope in a constructive alternative.

If Communism moves into India, it will not be because of a Chinese army at the borders and it will not be because of mistakes in the State Department. It will be because of the needs of multitudes that no one else has met and because of deep frustration that stems from the helplessness of government to make the necessary changes when its agents are corrupt. The reputation of Chinese Communism, because of its overcoming of corruption, makes it very attractive in the presence of that form of frustration. I am not fatalistic about India's going Communist. All that I seek to emphasize here is that if it does the main reason will not be military weakness here or there. If we think that we can prevent the spread of Communism by military power alone we are sure to neglect the effort to help countries that are threatened by Communism to find an alternative.

II

There is one form of our present pre-occupation with military power which is a special danger. It is the tendency in some circles to assume that we should make a frontal attack upon Russia or China. It is one thing to use military force to prevent the Communists from extending their power from one country to another. That is the meaning of the action of the United Nations in Korea and it is justified. But it is a colossal mistake to go beyond that and attempt by armed force to destroy Communism where it is already established. Those who believe in this policy almost invariably assume that we should use any anti-Communist allies in our efforts to accomplish this result. I was amazed on my return to America to find this policy presented by both *Time* and *Life* on the one hand and Senator Paul Douglas on the other. This policy is implicit in all proposals to use the forces of Chiang Kai-shek on the mainland of China.

I believe that any such frontal attack by military force upon Communism in Russia or China would be a mistake for the following reasons:

(1) It would be a venture beyond the limits of

American power. America must not act as though she were God.

(2) It would go very far to destroy any moral authority we may have left in Asia. It would prevent us from getting such moral authority back where we have lost it. A direct attack on Asia by America would be regarded as proof that America is now the great imperialist power. We must remember that Asia has been fighting imperialism for generations, that in this fight there is a good deal of Asian solidarity, that America is already deeply feared (irrationally feared, it may be) on the assumption that the power of a capitalistic country must be used imperialistically. Communist slogans make the most of that last point but it is believed far beyond Communist circles. Also, our connection with Chiang Kai-shek is a great moral handicap in Asia. It suggests that we are trying to force upon China a regime that has been rejected by the Chinese people. It was the rejection of the Kuomintang that created the situation into which Communism could easily move rather than the power or the wiles of Communism that caused the rejection of the Kuomintang.

(3) The policy of a frontal attack on Russia or China, if it became clearly known as the policy of this nation, might tempt Russia to begin a preventive war. There is still a chance that Russia will not risk general war in order to extend Communism. One reason is that other methods have so far proved to be effective. She may be convinced that war is inevitable in the end because of her dogma about the expected behavior of capitalistic countries. But that kind of conviction might still not lead to a preventive war on her part especially in view of her confidence, also a matter of Communistic dogma, that capitalistic countries are sure to grow weaker in the end because of the internal contradictions of capitalism. But if Russia became convinced that we plan the destruction of Communism in Russia on evidence that we supply in abundant measure, she might decide on a preventive war.

(4) Even if we were to defeat Russia and China, the problem of an alternative to Communism would remain. What would we do next to help the world to solve the problems that drive people to Communism, problems made far worse by the destructiveness and the misery of war?

We may be in a situation which is similar to that in which Lincoln found himself when he decided that the soundest policy was to prevent the extension of slavery into the free territories and not to make a frontal attack on slavery in the slave states. I do not use this as an argument from analogy to invoke the authority of Lincoln but merely to illustrate the point. Such a decision is not one that can be made on the basis of some absolute principle. It must be made in view of what we believe about the probable

effects of such a policy of frontal attack. We must take into account in such a judgment both the limits to what military power can accomplish and some of the Asiatic intangibles which we generally ignore.

III

I am very much afraid that America may become morally isolated. To most of the non-Communist world we already seem reckless and intransigent, too ready to take risks which in fact are greater risks to other nations than to ourselves. I do not deny that some of the criticism of America is the result of wishful thinking about China. But this criticism does stem in part from a clearer recognition in other countries of what has been said in this article about the limits of the military approach to Communism. The countries that imagine themselves as the battlefield in a third world war quite naturally see some things more clearly than we do. Such a general war might do far more to create the conditions making for totalitarianism than it would to preserve areas of freedom in the world, no matter who wins the victory. We can hardly blame any nation for thinking many times before choosing to be rescued from Communism as South Korea is being rescued at this moment.

There is also in the criticism of America a suspicion that while there may be much logic in what we advocate concerning China, it may miss actual possibilities in the situation. We say that the Chinese Communists are Stalinists and that Stalinists are all alike and, therefore that there is no chance to tempt China away from Russia. It is quite true that kind words or exhortations or concessions that leave us weaker will not accomplish anything here. But Stalinist dogmas are held by human beings and they are not proof against external facts. Is it not possible for us to create external situations which will magnify the conflict of interests between China and Russia? Up until now we have done everything, as though by intention, to drive China and Russia more closely together. Cannot we begin to reverse this process? The American view of the union of these two nations is too mechanical. It does not leave room for the ways in which it can be modified by the effects of external situations on human beings with varied fears and interests. The admission of Communist China into the United Nations is a symbol of this possibility. It is very late now, of course. We may have missed our chance. But most of the world believes that the fact that it may be too late is in considerable measure the result of our intransigence.

I fear that if the present trend continues America will have no friends who really believe in our policy except perhaps Spain, South Africa and Formosa. We are in danger of alienating the whole non-Communist world with which we have natural moral

and spiritual ties. Cannot we open our national mind a little on the assumption that we have no monopoly on wisdom? We should be thankful for the fact that we are committed to the United Nations and that through its discussions we may be protected from our own blindness to essential aspects of the world struggle.

An English View of American Policy

GARFIELD WILLIAMS

OUR opponent is not "Russian Imperialism." It is the utterly fanatical "religion" of Marxist Communism. (The historical analogy is not German or even British or Roman "imperialism." Rather it is the advance of Islam of 7th and 8th centuries or the Western Europe of the period of the Crusades.) The only hope of combating such a movement is by a greater religious movement, or by waiting until its fanatical religion disintegrates, and for that you may have to wait for centuries, though it is possible it may take place rapidly and be replaced by a vast anarchy or a frank and open "imperialism" controlled by a dictator. (The analogy is Revolutionary and Napoleonic France.)

The only certain way of defeating it is by the re-creation of a Christian domination, by calm yet intense faith, a movement which *could only* come into existence and be effective as a *spiritual movement* sufficiently powerful to be able to overcome the paralyzing effects of the present divisions of Christendom even if it did not resolve the problems of faith and order and unfaith which are the cause of those divisions.

All else that we do is of the nature of a palliative activity undertaken to mitigate the worst of the evil results arising from the varied onslaughts of our fanatical enemy, much as Christendom held back by force of arms the onslaughts of Islam at the gates of Vienna and the bastion of the Pyrenees and the shores of the Tyrrhenian Sea (and in the 8th century and again in the 17th century it was "a very near thing").

Fortunately the fundamental treatment of the rebirth and development of Faith and palliative treatment by force of arms and the resources of diplomacy are not mutually exclusive (as the "pacifist" would have us believe). There is, however, very great danger that those who direct and take part in palliative activities *should imagine that these will suffice*. (It may well be that future historians will

count the set-backs in Korea as providential since if they had not occurred the Western world might have imagined that she could destroy the Communist menace by material force which would in the end have produced greater disaster.)

I hold the view that, in our palliative activities, we are, on the whole, being wisely led by the United States which has been forced to assume the leadership. President Truman seems to me almost to grow daily in moral and political stature. Dean Acheson I regard as the best man thrown up by any nation at the present time to formulate our policy. And those other members of the Truman team whom we know (e.g., Marshall, Harriman, Bradley and company to whom now the profoundly trusted Eisenhower is added) command our intense respect.

Two things in American policy alarm me and cause distrust. There is (1) the hereditary distrust of the army leader meddling with politics which every Englishman hates. This makes me distrust MacArthur, *except as a military leader*, and (2) American party political animosities and vendettas seem to me to have disastrous consequences *now that they are played out on a world stage*. I do not know how much harm they do to the morale of the people of the U.S.A. All I do know is that they do an infinity of harm to the prestige of America in the rest of the Western world. In England they have a peculiarly disastrous effect as again and again they seem to the Englishman to contravene one of his most treasured conceptions of value which he calls "playing the game." It is difficult to exaggerate the feelings of detestation which are aroused in Englishmen like myself by the personal vendettas in American party-political life.

I am anxious to make this point of view plain to you. We Englishmen are neither Democrats nor Republicans. American party-politics mean nothing to us. It makes not the slightest difference to the average Englishman whether an American President calls himself a Republican or a Democrat. And as for any desire to *interfere* in American domestic party issues, it's safe to say that to do so would not even occur to the average Englishman. American domestic affairs are no business of his. *But* if he thought that the fate of those who were directing *the foreign policy of the Western world including England* was at the mercy of private party-political caucuses and the vendettas of U.S.A. party politics, then any acceptance of American political leadership would be to him quite simply unthinkable. I am really scared lest it should appear *rightly or wrongly* to the Englishman that mere party-political jealousies and strivings for power had succeeded in ousting Dean Acheson from his post. For if the Englishman believed that, then an irreparable blow would have been delivered against Anglo-American collaboration. The Englishman doesn't mind American lead-

ership making political or military mistakes. We are used to that in our own national life—very used to it! But the Englishman with every fiber of his being would resent an international leader being at the mercy of the kind of things in party political local and national animosities which rightly or wrongly he thinks are being used to oust Dean Acheson, who is an international leader, and a very trusted one. *I personally feel most strongly that American party-political leaders have not sufficiently grasped the fact that party-politics played on a world stage is a very different thing from playing them on the domestic stage.* But I also think that all the tact and political shrewdness and capacity for "give and take" engendered in the American politician by reason of his quite unique party-political system, more especially in his need from time to time to create a "platform" which has had to consider *state* demands and enthusiasms and peculiarities as well as *national* needs should be of immense service to him and to the world in the creation of a "platform" for the United Nations which has to take account of *national* demands and enthusiasms and peculiarities as well as *international* needs.

Well, so much for that!

I do not think world war is imminent. I do not believe that Russia has the slightest desire for world war, knowing full well that in another world war every nation, including Russia, would be defeated.

What Russian Communism wants is "world turmoil" for that makes the best seedbed for the sowing and germinating and development of Communist ideology which she believes in fanatically. She has been and is tremendously successful in creating "world turmoil." She uses every means including the assembly of the United Nations for demonstrating the apparent futility of the Western world's democratic way of life. She is a unity—unified by a great new secularist religion—the Western democratic world is no unity. It is not even Christian. It doesn't even pretend to be. So she has a tremendous advantage over us.

Yet the Western world is slowly, thanks very largely to the altruistic activities of the U.S.A., becoming more of a unity. And it is also gaining a certain calmness and confidence which is the best antidote to the Communists' attempts to produce turmoil. We must at all costs avoid "war fever" while we re-arm. Is there, perhaps, too much "war fever" in the U.S.A.? Calmness and confidence and trust is of the very essence of victory for us. We must fight turmoil with calm. A "great calm!"

Personally I feel sure we shall win the short-view victory. The long-view demands a victory of the Spirit of God in the life of the United Nations. It means for us a recreated Christendom. I do not despair even of achieving that in time. We need spiritual leadership for that.

A Conversion to Communism in France

STUART R. SCHRAM

I NOTICED her originally because of the extraordinary expression of sadness that burned in her eyes and hung about her bent shoulders. I had sat down with her as is the custom in such little Paris restaurants, where the room is always crowded and it is not expected that a person eating alone shall take an unoccupied table.

She flashed a quick smile, friendly and faintly wishful, and muttered some excuses for her gloomy appearance. We exchanged a few sentences of conversation, during which she learned that I was an American student.

There was a moment more of silence; then suddenly she said, with the abruptness of a person preoccupied with something, "What do you think of Marxism?"

I said that I found Marx's philosophy a mixture of exceedingly penetrating truths and extravagant errors. Asked to elaborate, I indicated briefly that I considered Marx's analysis of the importance of the neglected economic factor in history highly useful, and that the conception of the ideological taint in all philosophic speculation was also a very fertile one. As for the errors, I said, they consisted essentially in the apocalyptic aspects of Marx's theory, which led him for example to conclude that the proletariat and its leaders were exempt from the corruptions of ideology—i.e., self interest.

She listened with a slightly preoccupied air, as though all this were not the essential point. "But what do you think of Dialectical Materialism," she asked me when I had finished. I replied bluntly that if she meant by this the theory which attempted to demonstrate a determinism in society on the basis of the determinism of the physical universe, I considered it a pack of nonsense. The whole argument rested on a vague analogy; so far as I knew there existed no clearly-defined, solid proof that the one followed from the other. The step from the microcosm to the macrocosm was essentially an act of faith. Of course, if she meant economic determinism, that was another story.

It was immediately apparent that she did *not* mean economic determinism, but Dialectical Materialism, or even simply materialism. She was an independent thinker, she said, who tried to be objective, but she was sympathetic to Marxism and to materialism in particular. And she was sure that Dialectical Materialism did *not* rest on faith, but on solid reason.

She paused nervously for a minute, and then began to question me about my political views. I hesitated to answer, not because I had any reluctance to

expose my own ideas, but because I did not wish to alienate her sympathy and thus make it impossible to penetrate her mysterious mood. Evidently there was no help for it, however, so I began, as casually as possible. "You are going to find this a bit bizarre, no doubt, but I am a Christian, although a Christian of a particular sort."

Her eyes glittered with sympathetic interest. "No, no, I don't find it bizarre. I too have been a Catholic—a fervent Catholic."

Pressed for details, I outlined my private conception of a Christian political philosophy based essentially on the theology of Reinhold Niebuhr. She listened attentively as I struggled in my imperfect French through a recital of the essential ideas of Neo-orthodoxy. Such a moral theory, I continued, ruled out any utopianism, but nevertheless I felt that the level of opportunity for creative self-development might be increased by progressive economic changes involving the socialization of certain basic industries, provided democratic freedoms were maintained.

Again an abrupt shift—what did I think about outlawing the atomic bomb? I replied that it was a fine idea provided adequate international controls were also established. Did I know the United States had recently forced France and England to join an organization to develop radiological and bacteriological warfare? I replied that I had not heard of that, but unfortunately in a world of two great powers it was necessary to prepare for the worst. Why prepare for the worst? Who wanted war? Not the United States, certainly, I replied. Not the American people, perhaps, but what about the trusts which needed a war economy to make profits?

I shifted my approach. She had claimed to view things objectively, had she not? Now, Russia had a great army, which she was working very hard to make greater. And great armies in the past had been frequently known to attack neighboring states. Therefore, was not a policy of preparedness reasonable on the part of the West? Oh, but the Russian army would never attack neighboring countries! Why not? Because it was a people's army.

The only real danger to peace, my companion continued, was American imperialism. And what about Russian expansionism? Russia did not need to be aggressive—the revolution would do her work for her. Besides, her leaders were selfless altruists interested only in the happiness of their people. They might make mistakes, but they would never plunge their people into a war.

I attempted a conciliating gesture. "You see how difficult these times are," I said. "Here are you and I, two people who try to view things objectively, and yet we find it practically impossible to understand each other because of the emotional bias which distorts our view of things. We in America say,

'Yes, we have our faults, the race problem and all that, but in comparison with the things that go on in Russia!' And you say, 'Yes, the Soviet Union has its faults, but in comparison with the capitalist beasts who run the American trusts!' What can we do to understand each other in circumstances like that?'

She replied in a trance of preoccupation, seeming not even to grasp the nature of my attempt to balance the two attitudes. "Yes, it really is true that though the leaders of the Soviet Union may make mistakes, they are insignificant in comparison with the evil forces dominant in America."

Finding no other argument at hand, and still seeking a better understanding of her evident uneasiness, I remarked that to accept the Communist philosophy was one thing, but to accept the domination of a barbarous nation like Russia was quite another. The response was immediate. Throughout the afternoon she had spoken fitfully, punctuating her comments with long, moody silences. Now she became really animated for the first time.

It was precisely that which had drawn her to Communism, she said. France she felt was old and exhausted. French culture had grown sterile, and its intellectuals contributed nothing to the understanding or the welfare of society. It was only a young and barbarous people that offered life and hope of progress. Violence could be readily accepted as a necessary evil; in fact, the violence of the Revolution might revitalize France.

We rose to leave.

In the street I shook her hand. "*Au revoir*," I said. "*Bonne chance à vous—mais pas au Parti.*" She smiled warmly for a moment, turned, and walked rapidly away.

I have not written a detailed account of this meeting simply for the sake of describing a Communist in the act of conversion. In any case, there are obviously many individual factors in the present case: the girl's rebellion against an environment which refused to take her seriously; rejection of her Catholic faith for another which appeared to offer greater possibilities of self-realization; and various others, all of which anyone interested in psychology can easily perceive.

It is not a novel thing to suggest that the United States needs a policy which is not only anti-Communist, but positively democratic. Recently, indeed, Government spokesmen have increasingly voiced such a note. I suggest, however, on the basis of my own experience, that no one living in America can fully understand the urgency of this need. We progressive Americans, if I may collect under this heading a heterogeneous group of those who are neither Communist sympathizers, Spellman-style Catholics, or Old Guard Republicans, and therefore have not received an inspired political Word, understand well

enough the necessity of a creative and forward-looking policy for America. Unhappily, that consciousness is likely to be somewhat blunted by the knowledge that after all, life is comparatively comfortable in America, even for the average man, and that despite occasional accesses of hysteria there exists in America a degree of political freedom remarkable for these unhappy times. These facts do not diminish our desire to carry American democracy forward, but they may occasionally lead us to feel that after all there is plenty of time. If I do not deceive myself in thinking that my story of a soul in the process of committing itself is of some general significance, then that significance is precisely that there is *not* plenty of time.

I certainly do not wish to proclaim the bankruptcy and exhaustion of European civilization. Such an attitude is obviously absurd. On the other hand, there is equally no point in underestimating the weariness produced in Europe by the cumulative horrors of modern history. My ultra-civilized European friends tell me that we are two nations of barbarians confronting each other, the United States and Russia. There is truth in that, also, in many ways; but if this be so, we, like the Russians, ought to be able to exhibit the dynamism of a barbarian people. Of our economic and military vitality there is little doubt. On the other hand, the notion that the United States might also be the source of a dynamic and creative social and cultural tradition would undoubtedly have been received by my convert friend not as propaganda, even, but as a simple absurdity.

We pride ourselves on our capacity to produce for the world's needs. We cannot offer a formula for redemption, for release from all the ills of the past; we know that all such simple formulas are false. But can we not, I wonder, produce for export (and for home consumption) a brand of Americanism more hopeful than that of Senator McCarthy?

Sherwood Eddy Seminar

The Sherwood Eddy American Seminar sails on the Queen Elizabeth June 22, returning to New York on August 12. After two weeks in England, meeting a score of British leaders, it transfers to Berlin, thence to Vienna, Rome, Florence, Milan, the Matterhorn in Switzerland, to Geneva, studying the United Nations and World Council of Churches, and Paris. The cost will be approximately \$1,000. Membership will be limited to 50 who constantly speak or write, who will seek to interpret the needs of Europe to America. This is the twenty-first year of the Seminar, which is recognized by the political, educational and cultural leaders of Europe who meet with us daily. Applications should be sent to Dr. Sherwood Eddy, c/o The Open Road, 50 West 45th Street, New York 19, New York.

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North India Church Merger Reported Progressing

Representatives of four church bodies have reached a "basis of negotiation" in merger talks aimed at the establishment of a united Church of North India.

The (Anglican) Church of India, Burma and Ceylon, The Methodist Church of Southern Asia, British Methodist churches, and the United Church of Northern India participated in round-table conferences on church union that paved the way for the first meeting of a negotiating committee, scheduled for the last week in March.

Until now, differences and criticisms arising from the conferences have been handled by a continuation committee representing the four bodies. It was reported that a large measure of agreement has already been reached on one of the most delicate merger problems: the unification of ministries.

The North Indian negotiations are considered of special interest because of current efforts by the united

Church of South India to solve some of the problems that have arisen out of its formation in 1947 by a merger of Anglican, Presbyterian, Reformed, Methodist and Congregational churches.

Hope was expressed by merger leaders that the bodies negotiating for a North India church union might be joined by the Baptists, who have had two observers at the continuation committee meetings. This hope has been furthered by the participation of Baptists in the church union movement in Ceylon. Baptists also have been studying the possibility of merging with the South India Church.—*Religious News Service*.

Christian Reconstruction Team Aids Refugees

An announcement from Geneva states that a Christian team of reconstruction technicians has been organized to aid distressed refugees in the rural villages of northwest Greece.

Known as "Christian Village Service," the team will be made up of from five to seven workers of several denominations and nationalities. It will function under direction of an organizing committee, formed in Geneva recently under the auspices of the World Council of Churches.

Site chosen for the team's operations, slated to begin this spring, is the Jannina vicinity, an area described by Greek Orthodox Archbishop Spyridon as the "most needy" in the country. The CVS team will aid refugees returning to deserted villages to replant crops and rebuild damaged and destroyed farm buildings, shops and dwellings.

Through "Christian Village Service" it is also planned to distribute agricultural tools and implements, food and clothing to refugees in the sorely-stricken Jannina area. If possible, the team will cooperate with relief organizations like CARE, the Christian Rural Overseas Program (CROP) and the Heifer Project Committee.

The Brethren Service Commission has made a grant of \$5,000 toward the team's expenses in 1951, including provision of two "jeeps," a trailer and a quantity of food. The Church World Service department of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. has also agreed to supply food.

The Presbyterian Church, U.S.A., will support the project with a gift of \$5,000 and the Swedish Lutheran Church will provide and support a member of the team.

—*Religious News Service*.

Authors in This Issue

We are happy to publish Professor Bennett's reflections on American Policy in Asia. This illuminating article is the fruit of a visit by Professor Bennett made to India in recent months under the auspices of the International Missionary Council.

The Very Rev. Dr. Garfield Williams, who was formerly Dean of Manchester, has frequently visited this country. His article on American Policy was originally a private letter which we asked permission to publish.

Stuart R. Schram is a graduate student in Political Science who is spending a year in France.

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